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Abstract. Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous
cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work
is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a num-
ber of coins have adopted “ASIC-resistance” as a desirable property,
claiming to be more “egalitarian,” where egalitarianism refers to the
power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While
proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurren-
cies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block
minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criti-
cism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making
the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can con-
tribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper,
we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarian-
ism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular
cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among
them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show,
as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency’s egalitar-
ianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol,
Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency,
Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly se-
lected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting
folklore belief.
1 Introduction
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto proposed Bitcoin [25], the first and most suc-
cessful cryptocurrency to date. Bitcoin introduced a cryptographic con-
sensus protocol in which transactions are organized into blocks which are
put in a globally agreed sequence, the blockchain, despite the presence of
adversaries and without the need of any setup or identity system. Since its
inception, a plethora of alternative cryptocurrencies, or “altcoins,” have
sprung into existence, each claiming its own features.
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A major thread of blockchain research has focused on the mechanics
of consensus and specifically on the mechanism of identifying the party
responsible for producing a new block at any point. Bitcoin, as well as
the majority of altcoins, employs proof-of-work [12], where block gener-
ation is called mining and blocks are produced by miners who expend
computational power to solve cryptographic puzzles. On the other hand,
the most prominent alternative mechanism is proof-of-stake. In proof-
of-stake, block generation is, some times, called minting and blocks are
produced by minters who “stake” their coins, i.e., users who own a set of
coins and use them to participate in the consensus protocol. Intuitively,
in both cases a leader is drawn at regular intervals at random from the
block generators’ population, with a probability of selection proportional
to their computational power or stake respectively.
Block generators are incentivized to produce blocks by receiving a re-
ward for each block they successfully produce and which is subsequently
adopted in the resulting blockchain. In many cryptocurrencies, the re-
wards serve a dual purpose: incentivise the the miners/minters but also
create and distribute the underlying cryptocurrency to the system’s main-
tainers. Taking this into account, in this paper, we consider the block gen-
erators as investors and focus on the comparison of the expected returns of
investors with different purchasing power. The central economic property
which arises is that of cryptocurrency egalitarianism. In an ideal world,
investing a certain amount of capital to produce blocks should result in
rewards proportional to that capital; that is, both a poor investor and
a rich investor should receive returns in proportion to their investment
in expectation. In this point of view, wealthy investors should not be re-
warded with disproportionate rewards and everybody should have equal
opportunity to both participate and earn rewards. As we will see, this is
far from true with most cryptocurrencies today.
Until now, the term egalitarianism has been left undefined, although
several cryptocurrencies claim to be more egalitarian than others [31]
[24]. However, lacking a quantifiable metric, the question of whether some
cryptocurrencies are more egalitarian than others remains ill posed. Our
paper aims at putting forth the first concrete definition of egalitarian-
ism, in a way which is generic and can be applied to any cryptocurrency.
Our definition provides a metric, which can be practically measured and
used to compare different cryptocurrencies. Using our model, we measure
the egalitarianism of four indicative proof-of-work–based cryptocurren-
cies: Bitcoin, Litecoin [22], Ethereum [7,32], and Monero [31]. Bitcoin,
being the first and most successful cryptocurrency to date, was chosen as
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the baseline of comparison. Ethereum is the most promising altcoin and
is currently the largest decentralized cryptocurrency by market cap after
Bitcoin5. Litecoin and Monero, although not next by market cap, make
claims [31,24] of increased egalitarianism because of their design. We as-
sess their claims and find them in agreement with our data, thus present-
ing for the first time economic comparisons which quantify them precisely.
On the pure proof-of-stake side, as will soon become clear, egalitarian be-
havior is similar across all coins independently of externalities such as
hardware characteristics. Therefore, it suffices to perform a case study of
an indicative proof-of-stake protocol. We study the case of pure proof-
of-stake, applied on a protocol consistent with Ouroboros [20], as well
as a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake cryptocurrency, Decred [10]. We
find that pure proof-of-stake coins can be perfectly egalitarian, contrary
to their proof-of-work counterparts. However, we note that variations of
proof-of-stake, such as “delegated proof-of-stake,” may not be perfectly
egalitarian, since the delegates, i.e., the leaders of the stake pools which
are formed, typically earn extra profits for managing the stake pools [6].
Moreover, in both cases of proof-of-work and proof-of-stake we consider
an open market that enables participants to invest in mining or minting
without any barriers; introducing additional market constraints in acquir-
ing mining equipment or stake can similarly disturb the egalitarianism of
the underlying system.
Our Contributions and Roadmap. This work provides a quan-
titative evaluation of cryptocurrency egalitarianism. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first work to provide a treatment of this property
and acts as the foundation for comparing cryptocurrency fairness when
it comes to reward distribution. Specifically, the contributions of our re-
search are summarized as follows:
1. We define an exact measure of cryptocurrency egalitarianism; to do
this, we first define the egalitarian curve of a cryptocurrency from
which we extract the measure.
2. We measure and compare the egalitarian curve and egalitarianism
of four indicative proof-of-work cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum,
Litecoin, Monero), one representative proof-of-stake protocol (Ouro-
boros), and a hybrid cryptocurrency (Decred), using current market
data.
3. We show that proof-of-stake, when correctly parameterized, is, per-
haps unexpectedly, perfectly egalitarian.
5 All references to market cap in this paper are made according to https://
coinmarketcap.com [January 2019].
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing
related work and preliminaries in Sections 2 and 3. Next, we put forth our
definition for the egalitarian curve and egalitarianism of a cryptocurrency
and motivate its intuition in Section 4. In Section 5 we present empirical
data for several cryptocurrencies of interest and evaluate them under our
model, in order to deduce whether previous intuitive claims are indeed
correct. Finally, the conclusions of our research are drawn in Section 6.
2 Related work
The macro and microeconomics of blockchain design have been studied
from several perspectives but remain an active area of research with a
number of open questions. Incentives for block generation according to
the honest protocol have been explored for both proof-of-work and proof-
of-stake.
Proof-of-work protocols such as Bitcoin were formalized in the Bit-
coin Backbone [15,16] papers and follow-up works [26]. The seminal work
of Selfish Mining [13], see also [29,19] showed that honest behavior is
not incentive-compatible. Alternative reward sharing mechanisms in the
proof-of-stake setting make it feasible to behave better in terms of incen-
tive compatibility for instance Ouroboros [20] can be designed from the
ground up to be a Nash equilibrium under certain plausible conditions
and similarly, in the proof-of-work setting [27]. The question of how to
incentivize parties to conduct pool formation into the desired number of
pools, or groups of minters, was studied in [6].
Egalitarianism has been studied before in proof-of-work systems from
the perspective of memory-hard functions in [2,4], under the premise that
memory hardness provides egalitarianism in the sense that the it can be
used to argue that the cost of one computational step will be roughly
the same irrespective of the underlying computational platform (typically
ASIC vs. generic, cf. [4]). The approach we take here instead, asking
whether computational power grows proportionally to capital invested,
i.e., whether larger wealth results in more than proportional rewards, is
more general and it has not been previously studied to the best of our
knowledge.
Equitability of cryptocurrencies. Fanti et al. analyze economic block-
chain fairness in [14], where they define equitability. They study the evo-
lution of a system after a series of rounds, putting forth the property
that stake ownership remains in proportion before and after rewards have
been awarded. By studying the behaviour of the returns’ variance under
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the randomness of executions, they introduce a geometric reward func-
tion and show its optimality in terms of equitability. Whereas their eq-
uitability metric jointly captures the normalized variance of rewards for
every user conditioned on their initial resources (e.g., fraction of compu-
tational power for PoW), our egalitarianism metric instead captures the
population-wide variation of best-case expected returns for an initial cap-
ital distribution among participants. In other words, our randomness is
over the initial distribution of wealth, whereas theirs is over the evolution
of a single blockchain execution. In our work, we show that computa-
tional power is not proportional to the invested capital, and hence the
analogy between proof-of-work computational power and proof-of-stake
capital breaks down, and a more detailed study is needed. Additionally,
we remark that proof-of-work miners also reinvest their proceeds in the
mining operation, albeit slowly, as proof-of-stake minters do. For example,
empirical data show that large-scale miners pay for electricity using their
proceeds [18]. Hence, both mining and minting follow PÃşlya processes
as modelled by their paper. Regardless, egalitarianism and equitability
are orthogonal. A cryptocurrency can be perfectly egalitarian and poorly
equitable and vice versa. It is possible to obtain a cryptocurrency both
egalitarian and equitable by adopting correctly parameterized proof-of-
stake under a geometric reward function.
3 Preliminaries
Before studying the egalitarianism of different cryptocurrency consensus
mechanisms, we provide a description of the leader election process, which
is a central part of each blockchain consensus mechanism. We give an
overview of the details of the two most common decentralized consensus
mechanisms, proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, in order to establish an
understanding of the differences in egalitarianism between the two models.
Proof-of-work. The core idea behind proof-of-work cryptocurrencies is
solving the proof-of-work inequality. Specifically, the mining hardware is
provided with two constants, previd and data, i.e., the id of the tip
of the adopted blockchain and the data which need to be appended to
it. The mining device then brute-force searches for some string nonce,
such that H(previd||data||nonce) ≤ T for some hash function H de-
fined by the system. Here, T is a —relatively— small number called the
difficulty target, which is adjusted in order to ensure a stable block produc-
tion rate, although typically remains constant for periods of consecutive
blocks called epochs — for example, in Bitcoin, epochs are 2016 blocks
5
long [5]. Because the search for solutions is exhaustive, the expected num-
ber of solutions found by a given miner is proportional to the number of
evaluations of the hash function H she can obtain in a given time frame.
The number of hash evaluations is one of the several critical param-
eters to consider when purchasing mining hardware. Other important
parameters include the price of a mining unit, as well as its electricity
consumption. Mining hardware is divided in various tiers based on perfor-
mance, namely CPU miners, GPU miners, FPGA miners, and specialized
ASIC miners [30]. Although the pricing of such devices may be similar, the
hashing rate and, in turn, the return on investment, is highly dependent
on the hardware’s tier. For example, the mining hardware “Whatsminer
M10” produced by the company “MicroBT” costs $1,022.00 per unit and
produces $0.104266 per hour of operation in net gains, i.e., average mined
Bitcoins per hour denominated in US dollars with today’s prices (Decem-
ber 2018) minus the electricity costs. On the other hand, the mining
hardware “8 Nano Pro” produced by the company “ASICMiner” costs
$6,000.00 per unit, but produces $0.315327 per hour of operation in net
gains, i.e., almost three times the hourly net gains of its cheaper com-
petitor. Thus, if one can afford to purchase the more expensive hardware,
each of their subsequent dollar invested in electricity returns more mined
coins.
It has long been folklore knowledge in the blockchain community that
mining becomes more egalitarian by using a memory-hard proof-of-work
function. This intuition is correct, the core reason being the difficulty to
construct specialized hardware for memory-hard functions. For example,
no ASICs currently exist for Monero mining. Therefore, the only way to
scale mining operations is by purchasing more general purpose hardware.
However, since the mining hardware in this case varies little, both in
terms of cost and performance, scaling returns become proportional to
investments. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to confirm
this correspondence between the memory-hardness of proof-of-work hash
functions and the economics of mining.
Remark 1 (Block generation at scale). We only analyze the scaling of the
economics of mining with respect to hardware. We also do not take into
account basic costs such as shipping and the availability of a basic machine
to co-ordinate mining (such as a personal computer not performing mining
itself). A multitude of additional factors play important roles for mining
operations, such as space rental costs, machine cooling and maintenance
costs, as well as bulk electricity purchase. As is common in economies of
scale, these relative costs are reduced for large-scale operations, although
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they are similar for all proof-of-work cryptocurrencies and thus do not
affect relative comparisons between them. We also remark that we analyze
mining costs for small capital investments. If larger capital, e.g. above a
few million US dollars, is available, corporations can develop their own
specialized hardware and gain a competitive advantage by treating it as
a trade secret [30]. Indeed, these details make our comparison in favour
of proof-of-stake more pronounced, as proof-of-stake operations do not
incur such types of costs and do not lend themselves to specialized mining
hardware research. We leave the analysis and calculation of egalitarianism
under these parameters for future work.
Proof-of-stake. In proof-of-stake, a minter is selected in proportion to
the stake they hold, which is to say proportionally to the amount of money
they own. There exist a number of flavors of this process. In one case,
all coins automatically participate in the leader election process — this
is the case for Ouroboros [20] and Ethereum’s Casper [8]. In a second
flavour, the stake has to opt-in to participate in the election by a special
process, such as purchasing a ticket or becoming a delegate of the stake of
other users. This is the case for cryptocurrencies such as Decred [10] and
EOS [21]. Among those participating in the election, a leader is elected
at random, in proportion to their stake.
Proof-of-stake is often criticized for its lack of egalitarianism. The ra-
tionale is that, in proof-of-stake, the more money one stakes, the more
money one generates. Thus, the rich get richer, which is precisely the
opposite of egalitarianism. Additionally, in proof-of-stake systems, the
money owners could constitute a closed, rich club, refusing to share the
assets with any outsiders. In contrast, this argument claims, proof-of-work
is naturally egalitarian: everyone is paid not according to the money they
own, but according to the computational power they put to work. In this
case, since computational power is a natural thing and cannot be exclu-
sively owned, a closed rich club cannot be formed. Although this argument
seems agreeable at first, the results of our work contradict it. In fact, cor-
rectly parameterized stake-based systems are much more egalitarian than
work-based ones.
It is instructive to dispel the above argument intuitively, before we
support our position with data. Firstly, the argument that money can be
exclusively owned, but computational power cannot, is rather misguided.
Indeed, this may be true in the case of a peculiar oligopoly, where a
small faction of parties mutually agrees to never sell to outsiders, despite
external demand. However, in an open market, both money and compu-
tational power can be freely purchased and, in fact, any non-negligible
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amount of computational power must be necessarily purchased that way.
In the present work, we assume an open market for both mining hard-
ware and financial capital which allows participation in the respective
systems. Therefore, given that both money and computational power are
purchasable, we now need to consider the funds one needs to invest either
in technology or in financial capital in order to maximize the returns from
a cryptocurrency’s block generation mechanisms. The amount of crypto-
currency generated by a given investment can be concretely measured
and compared, thus the question can now be analyzed quantitatively and
answered concretely.
We should note that variations of proof-of-stake, such as “delegated
proof-of-stake,” may not be perfectly egalitarian, since the delegates, i.e.,
the leaders of the stake pools which are formed, typically earn extra profits
for managing the stake pools [6]. In this paper, we only concern ourselves
with non-delegated variants, i.e., pure proof-of-stake protocols. We leave
the study of the contrast between pool formation mechanism truthfulness
(or Sybil-resilience) and egalitarianism for future work.
4 Defining egalitarianism
Having established the basics of consensus mechanisms, we now propose
the first definition of an economic measure of egalitarianism in cryptocur-
rencies. Before we present our definition, let us first state the desiderata of
such a definition. First of all, we want to allow concrete measurements to
be performed on cryptocurrencies and data to be extracted in a manner
that is quantitative and not vague. Thus far, the claims for egalitarianism
in various cryptocurrencies have been rather informal, using a rhetoric
which fails to include exact data [31,24]. As such, different cryptocur-
rencies claim egalitarianism over the others, without demonstrating the
claims or provide conclusive arguments. Secondly, a definition of egalitar-
ianism must measure the protocol maintenance returns of a “rich dollar”
compared to that of a “poor dollar.” We thus desire a measure which, for
a particular cryptocurrency, extracts a smaller value to indicate a lack of
egalitarianism (e.g. a case where large wealth generates blocks dispropor-
tionately faster than small wealth) and a larger value to indicate perfect
egalitarianism (where every invested dollar has exactly equal power in
terms of cryptocurrency generation).
As a means towards establishing our egalitarianism definition, we de-
fine the egalitarian curve f of a cryptocurrency. The horizontal axis of
this curve plots the financial capital which is available for investment de-
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nominated in a fiat currency, USD.6 The vertical axis plots the Return
On Investment (ROI), which measures the cryptocurrency amount that
is freshly generated in the investment period and remains unspent at the
end of the investment period, given an optimal allocation of the initial
capital. We require the Return On Investment is necessarily freshly gen-
erated cryptocurrency; thus, it must be newly mined or minted, and not
part of the initial capital. Of course, purchasing cryptocurrency which has
already been generated is an investment option, but it is immaterial to
our egalitarianism definition, which focuses on measuring the egalitarian-
ism of freshly generated cryptocurrency. Finally, the curve is plotted with
a fixed investment duration in mind — in this paper, we use a duration
of 1 year. Naturally, curves of different cryptocurrencies can be compared
only if they use the same duration.
Definition 1 (Egalitarian curve). Given a cryptocurrency c, an in-
vestment period interval d, the set of all possible investment strategies
B, we define the egalitarian curve fc,d : R+ −→ R+ of c for investment
period d as:
fc,d(v) =
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
The value max
B∈B
E[B(v)] identifies the maximum expectation of returns
across all investment strategies B, i.e., the amount of returns which the
optimal strategy ensures for a given initial capital v. The expectation is
taken with the blockchain execution as a random variable, since returns
vary by execution (the randomness of the execution can affect the re-
turns of the strategy, as the same strategy can bring larger returns if the
participant is “lucky” e.g., it happens to produce many blocks [14]).
We remark first that we do allow strategies to reinvest capital. For in-
stance, returns earned from mining rewards can be reinvested in electric-
ity costs for future mining. Furthermore, for unit consistency, we assume
the strategy B(v) returns the freshly generated coins denominated in the
same units as the capital v was given in, such that f represents a ROI;
thus, we denominate the generated cryptocurrencies in USD using the
market exchange rate. Second, we assume participants act independently
and follow the protocol according to its specifications.
6 Given that we explore a small investment duration, it makes little difference whether
these are nominal USD or real USD, as long as they are the same when applying
comparisons.
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Based on the above, it is now straightforward to define the ideal egali-
tarian curve. In this case, the ROI is stable regardless of capital invested.
Under these ideal conditions, the amount of freshly generated cryptocur-
rency is exactly proportional to the money invested. Thus, the ideal curve
is any constant curve.
As an interesting thought experiment, consider the egalitarian curve
which is decreasing. In this case, the poor would receive proportionally
more newly created cryptocurrencies for every dollar they invest, i.e.,
it would be a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. How-
ever, one can quickly see that, in decentralized cryptocurrencies where
the identities of the participants are unknown, it is impossible to hope for
something better than the constant curve. Indeed, the fact that decentral-
ized cryptocurrencies allow anonymous generation of new identities [11]
allows a rich investor to split their investment into smaller ones. Thus,
if the curve were ever to have a negative slope, the sum of the smaller
splits of the rich investment would achieve a higher gain. By the defini-
tion of the curve, which mandates that it depicts the ROI of an optimal
investment, this would be a contradiction. The following lemma makes
the above intuition more precise:
Lemma 1 (Sybil strategies). Fix a cryptocurrency c and an invest-
ment period interval d. Given capital v, for every natural number i ∈ N?,
it holds that fc,d(v) ≤ fc,d(i · v).
The proof of this Lemma is available in Appendix A.
Using our definition of the egalitarian curve, we now define egalitari-
anism as a concrete number. We begin by considering the initial capital
v as a random variable following a certain distribution D. Egalitarianism
is defined as the variance of the expected ROI when the capital is chosen
from the given distribution.
Definition 2 (Egalitarianism). Given a cryptocurrency c, an invest-
ment period duration d and an initial capital distribution D, we define
the egalitarianism e of c for investment duration d under initial capital
distribution D as follows:
ec,d,D = −Varv←D[fc,d(v)]
where f is the egalitarian curve of c.
The intuition behind this definition is that, to have egalitarianism,
the ROI must remain the same across different capital investments. As
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such, any deviation from the mean is non-egalitarian. Naturally, if the
egalitarianism of a certain cryptocurrency is higher than another’s, we
say that the former is more egalitarian than the latter. Of course, to be
accurate, such comparisons must only be made after fixing the parameters
c and d as well as the initial capital distribution D. We will now fix the
distribution D to be the uniform distribution between a minimum and
a maximum capital. This choice corresponds to the intuition that the
returns are the same for all initial capitals alike. Clearly a cryptocurrency
with an ideal egalitarian curve is perfectly egalitarian, as we now define.
Definition 3 (Perfect egalitarianism). A cryptocurrency c is per-
fectly egalitarian for investment duration d and initial capital distribution
D if ec,d,D = 0.
5 Experimental results
Having established our theoretical framework, we now provide experi-
mental results on the egalitarianism of various cryptocurrencies. Our ex-
periments utilize the egalitarian curve definition of Section 4 in order to
concretely confirm — or disprove — the egalitarianism claims of some of
the major, both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, cryptocurrencies.
In conducting our experiments we assume a static environment.
Specifically, we assume that the token prices, as well as the distribution of
funds which are available for purchasing mining hardware are static and
follow the snapshot of the world which we took at the time of writing.
Furthermore, we assume that our mining operation would not substan-
tially affect these parameters if it were to be applied on this environment.
Finally, we assume that the set of available strategies B comprises of the
honest strategies, e.g. not including selfish mining which could provide
better ROI by diverging from the protocol.
Proof-of-work. We have experimentally analyzed the egalitarianism of
the following proof-of-work coins: Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, and Mo-
nero. These cryptocurrencies act as a representative sample among the
thousands of existing cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin is the largest and most
successful cryptocurrency by market cap. Litecoin is the first cryptocur-
rency aimed at becoming more egalitarian by replacing Bitcoin’s SHA256
work function with scrypt [28], a memory-hard function [3]. Ethereum
is one of the most promising alternative cryptocurrencies, the first to
support smart contracts, and the second largest by market cap; its proof-
of-work function is different from both Bitcoin and Litecoin. Finally, Mo-
nero is special with claims of strong egalitarianism due to its memory-
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hard mining function, Cryptonight [31]. Furthermore, its protocol is often
updated to maintain egalitarianism [9].
As expected, our experiments show that Bitcoin is the least egalitarian
of the four, with Ethereum following next. Monero is more egalitarian
than both, with Litecoin being the most egalitarian among the proof-of-
work coins we have studied.
For our experimental setting, we worked as follows. First, we collected
empirical data which describe the available mining hardware options in
the market. For each machine choice, we determined the cost of invest-
ment. This is comprised of its initial price (in USD) as well as its energy
cost of operation (in Watts). The cost of operation was translated to USD
per hour by considering the electricity cost of KWh. As a reference, we
used the lowest average KWh cost in the United States, i.e., $0.08 per
KWh [1]. This reference electricity cost is an estimation which can vary
depending on the country of operation.
Second, we use the reported hash rate of each mining hardware ma-
chine to extract an expectation of the freshly mined coins it would gen-
erate per hour, if it were to run continuously. This expectation is taken
over the randomness of all honest blockchain protocol executions. As such,
each party is awarded block rewards in proportion to their computational
power. The difference between revenue per unit of time and cost of op-
eration per unit of time produces an income rate, which is measured in
USD per hour. For our experiments, we use an interval of investment with
|d| = 1 year. Although this choice is arbitrary, it corresponds to the usual
definition of ROI in traditional finance.
Our investment strategy is as follows. The initial available capital
is allocated to an upfront technology investment, in which an integer
instance of the Unbounded Knapsack problem [23] is solved using dynamic
programming7 to optimize the total cash flow. Subsequently, as long as
the cash flow is positive, the purchased machines operate for the indicated
total duration, reinvesting part of the freshly minted coins in electricity
costs, in order to generate more coins. Eventually, this strategy produces
an income of freshly generated coins, which have not been spent and are
reported as the strategy’s income.
To calculate our concrete numbers, we employ the constants shown in
Table 1. We use the expected block generation rates for each cryptocur-
rency, as well as the reward per block, token price, and mining difficulty at
the time of writing, all of which we assume remain constant. The variance
7 The source code of our implementation for this calculation is available in our repos-
itory.
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of electricity cost, the duration of investment, as well as small fluctua-
tions in price and difficulty do not qualitatively change the shape of our
egalitarian curves (see Appendix C).
Variable Description Unit BTC ETH LTC XMR DCR
|d| duration of investment years 1
ec electricity cost USD / kWh 0.08
bgr(c) block generation rate blocks / s 1 / 600 1 / 14.7 1 / 150 1 / 120 1 / 298
thr(c) total hash rate Thash / s 34,727,437 179.50374 174.537 0.00033859 178,760
br(c) reward per block tokens 12.5 3 25 3.37 11.38
tp(c) token price token / USD 4,074.25 126.12 32.10 47.27 18.62
Table 1: A list of the parameters used in our proof-of-work mining simu-
lations. Some parameters are system-agnostic, whereas others depend on
the cryptocurrency c.
LetM denote the set of all available mining machines. For each ma-
chine m ∈ M, our empirically collected data specifies the following pa-
rameters: i) the energy consumption rate ecr(m) in Watts, ii) an initial
cost of purchase ic(m) in USD, and iii) a hash rate hr(m) in Terahashes
per second. Given the above, we can now calculate the expected income
rate per hour E[ir(m)] for a given machine m and a cryptocurrency c. In
the following equation, the first part identifies the income per hour, i.e.,
the amount of tokens (denominated in USD) which the machine produces
per hour, whereas the second part of the equation identifies the electricity
cost, i.e., the product of the consumed electricity multiplied by the price
of a single KWh:
E[ir(m)] = 3600 · hr(m)thr(c) · br(c) · bgr(c) · tp(c)− ecr(m) · ec
There are many possible configurations for technology investments.
Each configuration comprises of a number of copies n ∈ N of every ma-
chine typem ∈M. Therefore, we define each configuration asm ⊆M×N,
with total initial cost of investment for such configuration being ic(m) =∑
(m,n)∈m n · ic(m).
The above figure is given in USD per hour and, since the initial capital
should suffice to buy the machines of the configuration, we require that
ic(m) ≤ v, where v is the initial available capital at the beginning of the
simulation.
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Now, in order to identify the strategy’s optimal net income for the
interval d, we iterate over all possible machine configurations, for which
the above inequality holds, and choose the one with the maximum returns:
BOPT(v) = max {
∑
(m,n)∈m
|d|E[ir(m)] : m ⊆M× N ∧ ic(m) ≤ v}
We note that this is only an approximation to the optimal (in our
limited model) solution, which we used in our simulations. We consider
this sufficiently close to optimal to allow for the calculation of egalitarian-
ism. We give an integer programming formulation of the optimal strategy
for capital allocation in Appendix B. We remark here that the general
problem of mining hardware allocation (including our simplified approx-
imation) is computationally hard [17], as both the Knapsack and the
Integer Programming problems are NP-complete.
As the simulation parameters are many and diverse, in order to al-
low others to run the experiments with different values, as well as for
reasons of reproducibility and falsifiability, we openly release our mining
investment optimizer as well as our data for public use8.
The egalitarianism of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin and Monero are
shown in Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d respectively. Decred is a hybrid
proof-of-work/proof-of-stake cryptocurrency, in which block generation
is a collaboration between miners and minters. Specifically, each block
which is mined via proof-of-work needs to be “vouched for” by a certain
number of minters, who give it a vote of confidence. Both the miners
and the minters who participate in block generation are rewarded. An
investor can therefore choose to participate in Decred by either investing
in mining hardware and performing proof-of-work, or by purchasing stake
and performing proof-of-stake (or a combination thereof). We note that
the choice of whether to mine or mint Decred is not always clear. While
mining may be more profitable for a certain initial capital, it can also
carry various risks. For instance, if the difficulty increases, the mining
hardware may be rendered inefficient and also hard to sell. Proof-of-work
also carries the operational overhead discussed in Remark 1. On the other
hand, stake can always be sold, although the price may fluctuate, and
carries negligible operational overhead. As the decision between the two is
8 Our mining investment calculator and our mining hardware data are available under
the MIT license and a Creative Commons 4.0 Attribution License respectively at
https://github.com/decrypto-org/egalitarianism.
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Fig. 1: Egalitarianism curves of the proof-of-work cryptocurrencies ana-
lyzed in this work.
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not obvious, we analyze both strategies independently. The egalitarianism
of proof-of-work mining for Decred is shown in Figure 1d.
It is evident from all figures that the ROI is “capped” by a maximum
value, which is observed in specified intervals. Indeed, this value identifies
the ROI of the best available machine and is in line with Lemma 1. In other
words, as long as an investor is able to buy the machine which returns the
most profits, then they achieve the best possible ROI. In case an investor
does not have enough capital to buy the best mining product, they may
buy a less profitable machine and achieve less, though still positive, ROI.
This observation explains the small spikes in ROI which may be seen
e.g. in Bitcoin’s figure for capital in the range [0, 2000]. Also, in case the
capital is more than the cost of the machine, then the remaining capital
is effectively discarded. Therefore, although two investors A,B may start
with initial capital vA < vB, if their returns, in absolute terms, are the
same, then the ROI of B will be smaller as a percentage compared to the
ROI of A. This observation explains the decrease in ROI after the spikes.
Finally, we observe that, as the capital increases, the ROI converges to
the cap. This is explained by the fact that the “discarded” capital, i.e.,
the capital which cannot be invested in mining hardware, is a significantly
smaller percentage of the total capital for large investments.
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(b) Pure proof-of-stake Ouroboros
Fig. 2: The egalitarianism curves of the proof-of-stake systems analyzed
in this work.
Proof-of-stake.We now analyze the proof-of-stake egalitarianism in two
settings. First, we consider pure proof-of-stake, which can be applied on
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top of a protocol like Ouroboros. In this case, pure is in opposition to
delegated proof-of-stake, a setting where the stakeholders are required to
delegate their stake to other parties, namely “stake pools” and is de-
ployed in cryptocurrencies such as EOS, Bitshares, and others. Second,
we consider the case of minting Decred via its proof-of-stake mechanism.
The egalitarian curve for staking Decred is illustrated in Figure 2a.
As mentioned above, Decred is an opt-in staking cryptocurrency, where
staking occurs by purchasing so-called tickets. Since the price of a ticket
is quantized, egalitarianism is harmed for capitals which are not multiples
of ticket prices. However, one can see that the envelope of maxima of this
curve is perfectly egalitarian. The spikes that cause the discontinuity of
the curve are due to the large ticket price (currently $1756), which in
Decred is determined by the market and is high due to the limited supply
of tickets available per ticket pool, a parameter inherent in their protocol.
Perfect egalitarianism could in principle be achieved by making the ticket
price approach 0.
In the case of Ouroboros, every coin has the same probability of being
chosen for extending the chain [20]. When a coin is eligible for block
generation, its owner can create a block by providing a proof of ownership
of the chosen coin. Consider the case of a cryptocurrency with N coins in
circulation. When a block needs to be created, a coin is chosen at random
from the set of N coins. Therefore, each coin may be chosen with 1N
probability. Then the address which owns the chosen coin, in other words
the stakeholder which controls this coin, is eligible to generate a block
and receive the block rewards associated with it.9 In our experiments,
we assume that every block is associated with a constant reward, which
pertains to newly minted coins. Furthermore, since computational power
does not affect the rate of block production, it is reasonable to assume
that both the electricity and the hardware equipment’s price is constant
for all users, regardless of stake accumulation, so all users can participate
using — relatively — cheap resources (cf. Remark 1).
Figure 2b depicts the simulation of a pure proof-of-stake system. In
this case, the users pay a set transaction fee10 for the purchase of the
initial stake. The rest of their capital is allocated as stake. The figure
9 In [20] the payout does not explicitly include freshly minted coins and is comprised
of transaction fees. We consider an identical reward schedule as [20] but comprised
only of freshly minted coins.
10 As of January 2019, according to https://cardanoexplorer.com/, in the Cardano
implementation of Ouroboros these fees are in the order of $0.01.
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suggests that this system is closer to perfect egalitarianism compared to
the rest of our case studies.
Summary. Our findings are summarized in Table 2. We find that Bit-
coin is the least egalitarian, followed in turn by Ethereum, Monero, and
Litecoin11. The latter two are the most egalitarian due to their use of
CryptoNight and scrypt respectively. Mining with Decred provides the
worst egalitarianism of all tested coins. However, the most egalitarian
coins involve staking. Decred staking, due to its quantized ticket pricing,
is only approximately egalitarian and comparable to the performance of
mining Litecoin. Pure proof-of-stake, which allows continuous staking, is
almost perfectly egalitarian, its small divergence from perfect egalitar-
ianism stemming from the small capital which is required to pay the
transation fees to participate in the staking process.
Name Consensus mechanism Egalitarianism
Bitcoin Proof-of-work -0.034490298
Ethereum Proof-of-work -0.006926114
Litecoin Proof-of-work -0.000271822
Monero Proof-of-work -0.002206135
Decred Proof-of-workProof-of-stake
-0.412524642
-0.000348280
Ouroboros Proof-of-stake -0.000000295
Table 2: A comparison of the egalitarianism values of the cryptocurrencies
explored in this study.
6 Conclusion
In this work we explore the notion of egalitarianism of cryptocurrencies.
Although this notion has long been discussed, we are the first to give a
definition, which allows us to concretely argue about the egalitarianism
of various existing systems.
The results of our experimental simulations are very optimistic in
terms of usability of our metric, as they provide concrete figures which
measure the egalitarianism of several popular cryptocurrencies. The most
unexpected result arises from the comparison between the proof-of-work
11 Litecoin may appear to have better egalitarianism compared to Monero due to lim-
ited availability of mining machines. More data are needed to economically compare
scrypt and CryptoNight mining.
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and proof-of-stake mechanisms. Although blockchain folklore argued in
favour of proof-of-work systems in terms of egalitarianism, our results
show that, in fact, it is proof-of-stake systems which are more egalitarian
in our model.
Our work provides the first step towards establishing a concrete frame-
work of egalitarianism evaluation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Future
work will focus in evaluating more existing cryptocurrencies and inves-
tigating variations of consensus mechanisms such as delegated proof-of-
stake. Additionally, we leave for future work the treatment of more com-
plex economical models of the mining game such as dynamic systems and
adversarial strategies, as well as economies of scale in the multitude of
parameters we have ignored, such as electricity bulk pricing. We conjec-
ture the consideration of such parameters will exacerbate the gap between
proof-of-work and proof-of-stake which we have illustrated in this work.
Finally, we remark that neither proof-of-work nor proof-of-stake block-
chains are politically egalitarian systems, in which the ideal of one human
one vote is attained. Instead, at best, one coin one vote is attained in the
case of well-parameterized proof-of-stake systems. Thus, as illustrated
in this paper, blockchain systems are, for the time being, plutocratic.
Whether decentralized decision making in which each human is allocated
one vote is possible remains an open question. In such a system, the egal-
itarian curve would be strictly decreasing; however, our results, especially
Lemma 1, hint towards our conjecture that such systems are impossible
in a Sybil-resilient setting.
References
1. U.S. Energy Information Administration. Electric power monthly with data for
november 2018. Technical report, Jan 2019.
2. Joël Alwen, Jeremiah Blocki, and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Depth-robust graphs and
their cumulative memory complexity. In Annual International Conference on the
Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 3–32. Springer, 2017.
3. Joël Alwen, Binyi Chen, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Leonid Reyzin, and Stefano Tessaro.
Scrypt is maximally memory-hard. In Jean-Sébastien Coron and Jesper Buus
Nielsen, editors, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2017 - 36th Annual Inter-
national Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques,
Paris, France, April 30 - May 4, 2017, Proceedings, Part III, volume 10212 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 33–62, 2017.
4. Alex Biryukov and Dmitry Khovratovich. Egalitarian computing. In USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 315–326, 2016.
5. Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A.
Kroll, and Edward W. Felten. SoK: Research perspectives and challenges for
bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. In 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 104–121. IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2015.
19
6. Lars Brünjes, Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, and Aikaterini-Panagiota
Stouka. Reward sharing schemes for stake pools. Computer Science and Game
Theory (cs.GT) arXiv:1807.11218, 2018.
7. Vitalik Buterin et al. A next-generation smart contract and decentralized appli-
cation platform. white paper, 2014.
8. Vitalik Buterin and Virgil Griffith. Casper the friendly finality gadget. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.09437, 2017.
9. dEBRYUNE and dnaleor. Pow change and key reuse. Available at: https://
www.getmonero.org/2018/02/11/PoW-change-and-key-reuse.html, Feb 2018.
10. The Decred Developers. Decred documentation. Available at: https://
docs.decred.org/, 2016.
11. John R Douceur. The sybil attack. In International workshop on peer-to-peer
systems, pages 251–260. Springer, 2002.
12. Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor. Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail.
In Ernest F. Brickell, editor, CRYPTO’92, volume 740 of LNCS, pages 139–147.
Springer, Heidelberg, August 1993.
13. Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer. Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vul-
nerable. In Nicolas Christin and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, editors, FC 2014, volume
8437 of LNCS, pages 436–454. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2014.
14. Giulia Fanti, Leonid Kogan, Sewoong Oh, Kathleen Ruan, Pramod Viswanath,
and Gerui Wang. Compounding of wealth in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies. In
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer,
2019.
15. Juan A. Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos Leonardos. The bitcoin backbone
protocol: Analysis and applications. In Elisabeth Oswald and Marc Fischlin, edi-
tors, EUROCRYPT 2015, Part II, volume 9057 of LNCS, pages 281–310. Springer,
Heidelberg, April 2015.
16. Juan A. Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos Leonardos. The bitcoin backbone
protocol with chains of variable difficulty. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham,
editors, CRYPTO 2017, Part I, volume 10401 of LNCS, pages 291–323. Springer,
Heidelberg, August 2017.
17. Richard M Karp. Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In Complexity of
computer computations, pages 85–103. Springer, 1972.
18. Olga Kharif. Many bitcoin miners are at risk of turning unprofitable. Bloomberg,
Apr 2018.
19. Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou, and Yiannis Tselekounis.
Blockchain mining games. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Eco-
nomics and Computation, pages 365–382. ACM, 2016.
20. Aggelos Kiayias, Alexander Russell, Bernardo David, and Roman Oliynykov. Ouro-
boros: A provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. In Jonathan Katz and
Hovav Shacham, editors, CRYPTO 2017, Part I, volume 10401 of LNCS, pages
357–388. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2017.
21. Daniel Larimer and the EOS developers. Eos.io technical white paper
v2. Available at: https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/commits/master/
TechnicalWhitePaper.md, 2017.
22. Charles Lee. Litecoin, 2011.
23. George B Mathews. On the partition of numbers. Proceedings of the London
Mathematical Society, 1(1):486–490, 1896.
24. Robert McMillan. Ex-googler gives the world a better bitcoin. WIRED, Aug 2013.
20
25. Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Available at:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, 2008.
26. Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman, and Abhi Shelat. Analysis of the blockchain protocol
in asynchronous networks. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 643–673. Springer, 2017.
27. Rafael Pass and Elaine Shi. FruitChains: A fair blockchain. In Elad Michael Schiller
and Alexander A. Schwarzmann, editors, 36th ACM PODC, pages 315–324. ACM,
July 2017.
28. Colin Percival and Simon Josefsson. The scrypt password-based key derivation
function. Technical report, 2016.
29. Ayelet Sapirshtein, Yonatan Sompolinsky, and Aviv Zohar. Optimal selfish mining
strategies in bitcoin. In Jens Grossklags and Bart Preneel, editors, FC 2016, volume
9603 of LNCS, pages 515–532. Springer, Heidelberg, February 2016.
30. Michael Bedford Taylor. Bitcoin and the age of bespoke silicon. In Proceedings of
the 2013 International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for
Embedded Systems, page 16. IEEE Press, 2013.
31. Nicolas Van Saberhagen. Cryptonote v2.0. Available at: https://cryptonote.org/
whitepaper.pdf, 2013.
32. Gavin Wood. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger.
Ethereum project yellow paper, 151:1–32, 2014.
21
A Proofs
Lemma 1 (Sybil strategies). Fix a cryptocurrency c and an invest-
ment period interval d. Given capital v, for every natural number i ∈ N?,
it holds that fc,d(v) ≤ fc,d(i · v).
Proof. We prove the statement via contradiction. Assume that for capital
v exists a natural number i ∈ N? such that fc,d(v) > fc,d(i·v). Also assume
that for capital v the optimal strategy is B′, so: max
B∈B
E[B(v)] = E[B′(v)].
Then, for capital i·v exists a strategy B′′, such that the capital is split into
i equally-sized parts and the strategy B′ is applied on each part. Given
that the executions of the substrategies on these parts are independent,
then the expected returns for the strategy B′′ are:
E[B′′(i · v)] = i · E[B′(v)] = i ·max
B∈B
E[B(v)] (1)
It also holds that B′′ is at best the optimal strategy, so:
max
B∈B
E[B(i · v)] ≥ E[B′′(i · v)] (1)=⇒ max
B∈B
E[B(i · v)] ≥ i ·max
B∈B
E[B(v)] (2)
However, it should hold that:
fc,d(v) > fc,d(i · v)⇒
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
>
max
B∈B
E[B(i · v)]− i · v
i · v
(2)=⇒
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
>
i ·max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− i · v
i · v ⇒
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
>
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
(3)
which is impossible.
B Integer programming formulation
In our experiments, we used a Dynamic Programming solution to solve
the Knapsack problem in order to allocate mining machines upfront. An
optimal solution could use the proceeds of mining not only to reinvest in
electricity, but also to purchase new machines. This is captured by the
Integer Programming formulation in Figure 3, which gives the optimal
investment strategy in the full model.
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This maximization problem tries to optimize the freshly generated
proceeds. The variables to solve for, xm,t ∈ N, describe the number of
machines of type m that the investor holds at time t. We assume ma-
chines cannot be sold back to the market, hence xm,t−0 ≤ xm,t. The
investment starts with initial capital v and no machines, hence xm,0 = 0.
The program can then decide to purchase machines as time goes by. For
any costs, it first uses up the initial capital v to pay for them (this initial
capital is useless to keep, as it does not contribute to freshly generated
proceeds, which are our utility here), and subsequently uses the proceeds
to pay for any remaining costs. Capital which is not expended to pay
for costs is discarded by the max operator in the maximization clause.
The condition the integer program is subject to requires that the invest-
ment has non-negative capital at every point in time, and hence does
not run out of money. In this formulation, it is assumed that d is a set of
consecutive integers representing indexed hours of execution (a more fine-
grained solution can be obtained by increasing this temporal resolution
as needed).
Maximize
max(0, v −
∑
t∈d\d[0]
∑
m∈m
(xm,t − xm,t−1)ic(mi)−
∑
t∈d
∑
m∈m
xm,t · ecr(m) · ec)
+
∑
t∈d
∑
m∈m
xm,t · 3600 · hr(m)thr(c) · br(c) · bgr(c) · tp(c)
subject to∑
t′≤t
t′ 6=d[0]
∑
m∈m
(xm,t′ − xm,t′−1)(−ic(mi) + (t− t′ + 1)|E[ir(m)]) ≤ v for t ∈ d
xm,t−1 ≤ xm,t for m ∈ m and t ∈ d \ d[0]
xm,d[0] = 0 for m ∈ m
and xm,t ∈ N for m ∈ m and t ∈ d
Fig. 3: An Integer Programming formulation of the optimal investment
strategy in our model.
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C Parameters affecting egalitarianism
Throughout this paper, we have assumed certain parameters (cryptocur-
rency prices, electricity prices, duration of investment and mining diffi-
culty) remain constant throughout the investment period. Furthermore,
we have taken into account current market values to the best of our
knowledge. We note that, while the actual egalitarianism numbers may
change depending on these parameters, the general shape of egalitarian
curves and the qualitative comparison between different cryptocurrencies
remains the same. To illustrate this point, we have measured the egal-
itarian curve of Bitcoin for varying parameter values. Our results are
demonstrated in Figure 4.
D Machines
Data for mining machines was obtained from a multitude of resources
on the Internet12. Data for graphics processing units (GPU) and central
processing units (CPU) was obtained by calculating the median of multi-
ple user benchmarks when available13. The price of each machine used in
our experiments is the reported retails price of machine at date of access.
When a new machine is not available for sale, the price of a used or refur-
bished machine is used. For reproducibility purposes, our complete data
set is openly available in our repository. For reference, we list a summary
of those machines which provide a positive net gain per hour after pur-
chase (and can thus be profitable under our assumed parameter values)
in Table 3.
12 An exhaustive list of our resources includes the online stores
https://whattomine.com/, https://cryptominer.deals/, https://
www.asicminervalue.com/, https://www.reddit.com/r/MoneroMining/
comments/9omjfb/rtx_2080_ti_mining_monero_at_1228hs_and_more/, https:
//www.newegg.com/, https://www.amazon.com/, https://shop.bitmain.com.cn,
https://www.cryptouniverse.at, https://canaan.io, http://miner.ebang.com.cn,
https://swminershop.com, https://asicminer.co, https://estrahash.com,
http://www.innosilicon.com, https://pangolinminer.com, https://
www.bitfily.io, https://hashdeploy.net/, https://www.pantech.company,
https://www.cryptominerbros.com, https://pandaminer.com, https:
//minersdeals.com, https://sharkmining.com, https://shop.miningstore.com,
https://mineshop.eu, https://www.bitmart.co.za, https://shop.futurebit.io,
https://www.aliexpress.com, https://bitech-mining.com, https://
asicminermarket.com, https://www.baikalminer.com, https://prominerz.com
13 https://www.xmrstak.com/tag/monero/, https://gpustats.com/, https:
//www.ethmonitoring.com/benchmark, https://monerobenchmarks.info/
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Fig. 4: Bitcoin egalitarian curves under varying parameters.
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Bitcoin
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
8 Nano Pro 76 · 1012 4,000 6,000
Whatsminer M10S 55 · 1012 3,500 2,558
Ebit E11++ 44 · 1012 1,980 2,024
8 Nano 44 · 1012 2,100 1,790
T3 43T 43 · 1012 2,100 2,279
Ebit E11+ 37 37 · 1012 2,035 1,517
WX6 34 · 1012 3,200 1,275
Whatsminer M10 33 · 1012 2,145 1,022
T2T-32T 32 · 1012 2,200 1,568
Ebit E11 30 · 1012 1,950 1,110
Antminer S15 (28T) 28 · 1012 1,596 1,249
Antminer S15 (27T) 27 · 1012 1,539 1,363
T2T-25T 25 · 1012 2,050 1,150
Snow Panther B1+ 24.5 · 1012 2,100 580
T2T-24T 24 · 1012 1,980 1,350
S11i 24 · 1012 2,300 937
Antminer T15 23 · 1012 1,541 840
Antminer S11 20.5 · 1012 1,435 512
AvalonMiner 921 20 · 1012 1,800 415
Antminer S9-Hydro 18 · 1012 1,728 713
Ebit E10 18 · 1012 1,650 2,999
T2 Terminator 17.2 · 1012 1,570 1,118
DragonMint T1 16 · 1012 1,480 1,600
AvalonMiner 851 15 · 1012 1,450 380
Antminer S9i 14.5 · 1012 1,365 440
Antminer S9j 14.5 · 1012 1,365 307
AvalonMiner 841 13.6 · 1012 1,290 354.44
SX6i 11 · 1012 900 419
Ethereum
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
A10 EthMaster 485 · 106 850 5,399
A10 EthMaster 432 · 106 740 4,799
Shark Extreme 2
(8×NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti) 420 · 10
6 1,500 9,779
Maximus+ (8×1080TI) 370 · 106 2,200 7,520
A10 EthMaster 365 · 106 650 4,099
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Ethereum Mining Rig
(12x AMD RX 570 GPU)
360 · 106 1,600 4,345
ULTRON (8×P104) 320 · 106 1,700 5,338
Ethereum Mining Rig
(8× NVIDIA 1080 8GB GPU) 310 · 10
6 1,100 6,267
Shark Extreme 2
(6×NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti) 300 · 10
6 1,200 7,880
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD Vega 56) 290 · 106 1,700 6,879
Shark Extreme 2
(8×NVIDIA GTX 1070 Ti 8 GB) 245 · 10
6 1,400 6,679
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD RX 580) 240 · 106 1,100 4,590
Ethereum Mining Rig
(8×AMD MSI RX 580 GPU) 240 · 10
6 1,000 3,453
IMPERIUM+ (8×RX 570/580) 230 · 106 1,300 3,577
Antminer G2 220 · 106 1,200 3,799
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD Vega 56) 220 · 106 1,275 5,680
Ethereum Mining Rig
(8×AMD MSI RX 570 GPU) 220 · 10
6 950 3,2253
Shark Extreme 2
(4×NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti) 210 · 10
6 800 4,979
Antminer E3 190 · 106 760 654
Shark Extreme 2
(6×NVIDIA GTX 1070 Ti 8 GB) 185 · 10
6 1,050 5,480
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD RX 580) 180 · 106 825 3,890
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD RX580 8gb GPU) 180 · 10
6 900 2,342
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD MSI RX 580 GPU) 175 · 10
6 860 1,967
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD MSI RX 580 GPU) 170 · 10
6 750 2,156
Thorium 6580 GPU 160.2 · 106 700 4,297
Thorium 6570 GPU 144 · 106 750 3,974
Shark Extreme 2
(4×NVIDIA GTX 1070 Ti 8 GB) 122 · 10
6 600 3,580
Zodiac 6-1060 GPU 120.78 · 106 750 3,222
Shark Extreme 2 (4×AMD RX 580) 120 · 106 550 2,590
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD MSI RX 560) 80 · 10
6 370 1,823
GeForce RTX 2080Ti 55 · 106 155 1,249
GeForce GTX 1080Ti 51.11 · 106 175 999
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RX Vega 64 44 · 106 230 399
GeForce RTX 2080 41 · 106 105 699
GeForce GTX TITAN X 40 · 106 250 1,099
P104-100 38.89 · 106 127 569
RX Vega 56 38.75 · 106 210 339
GeForce RTX 2070 38.5 · 106 140 499
GeForce GTX 1080 34.07 · 106 121 633
RX 580 31.3 · 106 110 185
GeForce GTX 1070 31.1 · 106 108 319
GeForce GTX 1070Ti 30.83 · 106 107 489
RX 570 29.85 · 106 65 142
RX 480 29.71 · 106 70 237
RX 470 29 · 106 60 340
GeForce GTX 1060 (6GB) 23.81 · 106 95 264
GeForce GTX 1060 (3GB) 19.32 · 106 69 189
GeForce GTX 1050Ti 13.18 · 106 75 169
Litecoin
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
A6 LTCMaster 123 · 107 1,500 3,000
A4+ LTCMaster 62 · 107 750 1,500
Apollo LTC Pod 10 · 107 100 299
Monero
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD Vega 56) 14,800 1,700 6,879
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD Vega 56) 11,000 1,275 5,680
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD RX 580) 6,880 1,100 4,590
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD RX 580) 5,160 825 3,890
Shark Extreme 2 (4×AMD RX 580) 3,440 550 2,590
RX Vega 64 2,020 140 399
RX Vega 56 1,920 140 339
GeForce RTX 2080Ti 1,200 150 1,249
RX 580 976 89 185
RX 480 965 140 237
Ryzen Threadripper 1920X 955 140 435
GeForce RTX 2080 898 132 699
GeForce GTX 2070 880 140 499
RX 470 840 120 340
GeForce GTX 1070 777 112 319
RX 570 740 90 142
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Ryzen 7 2700X 715 105 309
Ryzen 5 1600X 532 47 179
Ryzen 5 1600 531 65 159
Decred
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
Whatsminer D1 44 · 1012 2,200 1,588
Whatsminer DCR 44 · 1012 2,200 1,890
Antminer DR5 35 · 1012 1,610 1,282
STU-U1+ 12.8 · 1012 1,850 1,560
STU-U1 11 · 1012 1,600 1,389
Table 3: Machines used in experiments
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